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Federal Interpretation of State Law-
An Argument for Expanded Scope of Inquiry
I. INTRODUCTION
In 1938 the Supreme Court, in Erie Railroad Company v.
Tompkins,1 held that federal courts exercising diversity of
citizenship jurisdiction must apply state rather than federal de-
cisional law to questions of a "substantive" character. In so
doing, the decision raised the question of how a federal judge is
to ascertain and apply state decisional law, a question which has
provoked considerable comment from the courts2 and the aca-
demic community.3 Analytically the federal court's duty, as de-
fined in Erie, is somewhat unique. Normally, American judges,
both state and federal, are given considerable leeway in declar-
ing the appropriate rule of law to apply to the particular ques-
tion presented.4 Consequently, traditional notions of the proper
method of judicial decision-making, at least common law no-
tions,5 have developed within this flexible framework and have
1. 304 U.S. 64 (1938).
2. E.g., Bernhardt v. Polygraphic Co. of America, 350 U.S. 198
(1956); King v. Order of United Commercial Travelers, 333 U.S. 153(1948); Klaxon Co. v. Stentor Elec. lMrfg. Co., 313 U.S. 487 (1941); Fidelity
Union Trust Co. v. Field, 311 U.S. 169 (1940); Brooten v. Cudahy
Packing Co., 291 F.2d 284 (8th Cir. 1961); Mason v. American Emery
Wheel Works, 241 F.2d 906 (1st Cir. .957); Cooper v. American Air-
lines Inc., 149 F.2d 355 (2d Cir. 1945); Yoder v. Nu-Enamel Corp., 117
F.2d 488 (8th Cir. 1941); Pomerantz v. Clark, 101 F. Supp. 341 (D.
Mass. 1951).
3. E.g., Boner, Erie v. Tompkins: A Study in Judicial Precedent,
40 TEx. L. REv. 509 (1962); Clark, State Law in the Federal Courts: The
Brooding Omnipresence of Erie v. Tompkins, 55 YALE L.J. 267 (1946)[hereinafter cited as Clark]; Corbin, The Laws of the Several States,
50 YALE L.J. 762 (1941) [hereinafter cited as Corbin]; Gibbs, How Does
the Federal Judge Determine What is the Law of the State, 17 So. CAR. L.
REv. 487 (1965); Harnett & Thornton, ;Precedent in the Erie-Tompkins
Manner, 24 N.Y.U.L.Q. 770 (1949); Vestal, Erie R.R. v. Tompkins: A
Projection, 48 IowA L. REV. 248 (1963); Wright, The Federal Courts and
the Nature and Quality of State Law, 13 WAYNE L. REv. 317 (1967);
Note, How a Federal Court Determines State Law, 59 HAnv. L. REv. 1299(1946); Note, The Ascertainment of State Law in a Federal Diversity
Case, 40 IND. L.J. 541 (1965) [hereinafter cited as INDiANA].
4. Although it was once thought that judges only "found" and
applied the law, it is now generally recognized that they also necessar-
ily exercise a quasi-legislative function in the process of decision-
making. E.g., J. HuasT, Thu GRowTH OF A-zuiCA LAW 185 (1950).
5. It might be argued that in cases involving statutory interpre-
tation the judge is looking to another institution in order to determine
the law. However, at least in the cases since Erie, as will be explained
below, the role of the judge in ascertaining state law has been more
sharply limited than his role in interpreting statutes.
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reflected the needs and conditions of a process in which the power
to hear a case conferred the power to declare and apply the law
of the forum. Examples other than diversity cases exist of
courts asserting subject-matter jurisdiction which is not co-
extensive with their power to declare the law of the forum in
which they sit-most notably state cases involving choice of law
rules6 and federal cases in which there is federal subject-matter
jurisdiction.7 However, the effect of this anomalous circum-
stance on the role of the federal judge has been most significant
in diversity of citizenship litigation, perhaps because of the rel-
atively greater volume of litigation.8
The question raised by Erie is peculiar to a dual and juris-
dictionally overlapping judicial system within a federal form of
government. By virtue of the constitutional limitations on the
power of the federal government, 9 the states exercise sub-
stantially exclusive authority in adjusting the interests of per-
sons within their boundaries. 10 In the adjustment of these in-
terests the states have promulgated, through their legislatures,
executives, and courts, distinctive bodies of law to be applied to
all persons within the constitutional reach of their authority. To
a certain extent these bodies of law vary among the several
states, reflecting the different needs, customs, and philosophies
of the societies to which they apply. 1 Not only are such dis-
parities permissible in a federal system, but they provide, accord-
ing to some scholars, a healthy diversification of approaches to
the adjustment of conflicting interests of persons within our
society.'2 It is within this framework of federalism, in which
6. A. EHnENZwXEG, A TREATISE ON THE CONFLICT OF LAws § 127
(1962).
7. See, e.g., Commissioner v. Bosch, 387 U.S. 456 (1967); Na-
tional Bank v. General Mills Inc., 283 F.2d 574 (8th Cir. 1960). For a
discussion of the Supreme Court's application of Erie reasoning to a
federal question case see Comment, 52 MnNx. L. REV. 776 (1968).
8. See H. HART & H. WECHSLER, THE FEDERAL CouRTs AND THE
FEDERAL SYsErm 53-55 (1953).
9. U.S. CONST. amend. X.
10. For a general discussion of the role of states in adjusting the
interests of their own citizens within our federal form of government
see Hart, The Relations Between State and Federal Law, 54 COLUm. L.
REV. 489 (1955) [hereinafter cited as Hart].
11. Hart at 492-93. One of the best examples of this disparity is
the various divorce laws of the states. The distinctions which exist
between divorce statutes may be said to reflect the attitudes of the
particular people to which they apply. Another less notorious diver-
gence between the laws of the various states is found in judicial rules
defining proximate cause.
12. Hart at 493.
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each state has developed a unique body of decisional law, that
the instant problem-the role of the federal judge in diversity
of citizenship cases-arises. Consequently, any analysis of how
a federal judge is to ascertain and apply state law must neces-
sarily refer to basic, although often ill-defined, principles of fed-
eralism.
The purpose of this Note is to develop a standard of decision-
making to guide the federal judge in ascertaining state law, to
isolate factors to be considered in applying such a standard, and
to analyze the result of such application. Particular emphasis
will be placed on an examination of factors presently thought
to be outside the proper scope of judicial consideration and on
an evaluation of the usefulness of these factors and the possi-
bility of permitting their consideration by federal judges decid-
ing diversity of citizenship cases.
For nearly 100 years before Erie, Swift v. Tyson 13 provided
the authoritative definition of the federal judge's role in diversity
of citizenship cases in which no relevant state statutory law ex-
isted. In determining what law applied to the question whether a
bona fide purchaser of a bill of exchange could recover from the
original transferor, the Court was :equired to interpret section
34 of the Federal Judiciary Act of 1789.14 The Court in Swift
read the act as requiring the federal courts to follow state stat-
utory law and state decisional law ol a peculiarly local character,
but in matters of a commercial nature (e.g., a bill of exchange)
to find the rule of law "in the general principles and doctrines
of commercial jurisprudence."' 15 This holding directly rejected
defendant's argument that the Judiciary Act required applica-
13. 40 U.S. (16 Pet.) 1 (1842).
14. .. . that the laws of the several states, except where the
constitution, treaties or statutes of the United States shall oth-
erwise recognize or provide, shall be regarded as rules of deci-
sion in trials at common law, in the courts of the United States
in cases where they apply.
The Act as amended, 28 U.S.C. § 1652 (1964), is substantially the same.
15. 40 U.S. (16 Pet.) at 17, 18. M~any writers have attempted to
explain the decision. Mr. Justice Holmes suggested that it was the
product of a jurisprudence which believed law was found, not made.
See Black & White Taxicab Co. v. Brown & Yellow Taxicab Co., 276
U.S. 518, 532-33 (1928) (dissent). One historian thought the Swift deci-
sion grew out of a historically erroneous interpretation of the Rules of
Decision Act. Warren, New Light on the History of the Federal Judici-
ary Act of 1789, 37 HARV. L. REv. 49 (1923). Another historian disagrees,
arguing that a historical analysis of the origins of the Decision Act
supports Justice Story's original interpretation. W. CROSSE-y, POLITICS
AND THE CONSTITUTION 865-68 (1953).
[Vol. 53:806
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tion of state decisional as well as statutory law.16 A century of
diversity decisions expanded the original rule, until a general
federal common law had developed which applied to all diversity
cases.' 7 Since state common law was not always similar to fed-
eral common law, the activity of persons within a particular state
was regulated by two frequently conflicting bodies of law; which
body would apply in a particular case depended solely on
whether both litigants were citizens of the same state. The ef-
fect of the extension of the Swift rule is amply illustrated by a
case where a Kentucky corporation reincorporated in another
state to establish diversity of citizenship, and thereby take ad-
vantage of the more favorable federal common law.'8
It was against this background that the Supreme Court de-
cided Erie Railroad Company v. Tompkins. 9 In reversing the
lower court decision, which had been based on federal common
law, the Court found the Swift interpretation of the Rules of
Decision Act to be an unconstitutional assumption by the fed-
eral courts of powers not delegated to the federal government
by the Constitution. 20 In addition to noting the historical in-
accuracy of the Swift interpretation, the Erie Court articu-
lated two independent policies which are basic to the decision.
First, and most important, it stated that the mere presence of
jurisdiction over the parties does not confer on the federal courts
constitutional authority to declare substantive law to be applied
within the states.2' Second, the Court felt that equal justice
16. Defendant's Brief, 40 U.S. (16 Pet.) at 10-14.
17. In Baltimore & Ohio R.R. v. Baugh, 149 U.S. 368, 371 (1893),
the Swift decision was applied to tort cases. A further extension
occurred in Kuhn v. Fairmont Coal Co., 215 U.S. 349 (1910).
18. Black & White Taxicab Co. v. Brown & Yellow Taxicab Co.,
276 U.S. 518 (1928); see Holmes' dissent, id. at 532-34.
19. 304 U.S. 64 (1938). While walking down a railroad right-of-
way, Tompkins was struck and injured by an object projecting from
one of Erie's trains. Under federal common law, Tompkins was a licen-
see and the railroad was held to a reasonable man standard of care,
while under the law of Pennsylvania he was a trespasser and the rail-
road's duty toward him was quite minimal. The lower federal courts,
applying the Swift rule, and hence federal law, found Tompkins to be
a licensee and permitted recovery.
20. According to the Court, the Act's authors intended the words
"laws of the states" to include state decisional law. The Court also
recognized that the Swift decision had failed to promote a uniform
common law throughout the nation. As a result, forum shopping had
been encouraged and equal protection of the law within a state denied.
However, the court did not regard either of these grounds as sufficient
to justify overruling Swift. Instead, it grounded its decision on the
unconstitutionality of the Swift interpretation.
21. The validity of this argument has been questioned by legal
19691
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required, to the extent possible, application of the same law to
all persons regardless of their citizenship, and neutralization of
the advantage of forum shopping.22 Thus, with respect to di-
versity of citizenship cases, the general federal common law was
abolished and replaced by the anomaly of vesting jurisdiction in
a court while requiring it to apply the law of a different sover-
eign.2
3
Subsequent applications of the Erie rule24 have referred to
and refined these grounds despite disagreement among legal
scholars as to their relative validity. 25 The Erie opinion itself
scholars. Several commentators contend that the constitutional argu-
ment is dictum since it was not necessary for the decision. Clark at
278; Vestal, supra note 3, at 254. Others argue that the Constitution
grants Congress power to enable the federal courts to declare substan-
tive law in all cases in which they have jurisdiction. Clark at 278-79;
Currie, Change of Venue and the Conflict of Laws, 22 U. Cm. L. REv.
405, 469 (1955). For a recent discussion of these criticisms and a de-
fense of the Erie decision see Friendly, IEn Praise of Erie and of the New
Federal Common Law, 19 REcORD 64 (1964) [hereinafter referred to as
Friendly].
22. Erie R.R. v. Tompkins, 304 U.S. at 74-78.
23. Id. at 78. The Court there stated:
Except in matters governed by the Federal Constitution or by
Acts of Congress, the law to be applied in any case is the law
of the state. And whether the law of the State shall be de-
clared by its Legislature in a statute or by its highest court in a
decision is not a matter of federal concern. There is no federal
general common law. Congress has no power to declare sub-
stantive rules of common law applicable in a state whether they
be local in their nature or "general," be they commercial law
or a part of the law of torts. And no clause in the Constitu-
tion purports to confer such a power upon the federal courts.
24. See, e.g., Hanna v. Plummer, 380 U.S. 460 (1965); Byrd v. Blue
Ridge Elec. Co-op., 356 U.S. 525 (1958); Cohen v. Beneficial Indus. Loan
Corp., 337 U.S. 541 (1949); Ragan v. Merchants Transfer & Warehouse
Co., 337 U.S. 530 (1949); Guaranty Trust Co. v. York, 326 U.S. 99 (1945);
Klaxon Co. v. Stentor Elec. Mfg. Co., 313 U.S. 487 (1941); Ruhlin v.
New York Life Ins. Co., 304 U.S. 202 ,1938). Recent cases have re-
evaluated prior interpretations of Erie. In Byrd v. Blue Ridge Elec.
Co-op., supra, the Court, in re-examining the outcome-determinative
test of Guaranty Trust, had cause to reflect on the policies underlying
Erie. A more flexible application of the policy of uniformity within
the state was advanced when the Court found that countervailing fed-
eral interests must be recognized and balanced against the policies
enunciated in Erie. Further, in Hanna v. Plummer, supra, the Federal
Rules themselves were found to constitute a significant if not conclu-
sive federal interest. Therefore, in the case of a direct conflict between
state and federal procedural rules, intra-state uniformity was subordi-
nated to the federal interest of procedural uniformity in the federal
courts.
See note 102 infra, and accompanying text for a discussion of the
relevance of this new flexibility to the instant question of how a fed-
eral judge is to ascertain state law once it is found to be applicable.
25. See authority cited note 3 supra.
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shed little light on the problem of ascertaining unclear state
law, and for good reason;26 the question was not presented.
Nonetheless, in analyzing the proper role of the federal judge
with respect to state law in 1968, Erie provides the policies and
ground rules from which standards of judicial conduct may be
devised.
The notion that federal courts must ascertain state law is it-
self somewhat misleading since it implies the existence of a body
of law which is readily accessible and easily understood. On the
contrary, the state law is dynamic rather than static and finds
expression in many media, including statutes, decisions, and ad-
ministrative rulings.27 Furthermore, the very act of deciding a
case may be more than a mere application of the law; it may
also serve a declaratory function by restating, adding to, or
modifying the pre-existing "body of law." It is this multi-
sourced, dynamic body called state law which Erie requires the
federal judge to ascertain.
II. ORTHODOX METHODS OF ASCERTAINING
STATE LAW
Over the past 30 years, the Supreme Court, lower federal
courts, and legal writers have attempted to formulate a method
of judicial decision-making which would satisfy the requirements
of Erie. It should be noted at the outset that in those few in-
stances where the state's highest court had made a recent ruling
on an "all-fours" fact situation, the federal courts have had little
difficulty in applying the Erie rule.28 The problem of ascertain-
ment arises only when the highest court has not spoken, either
recently or at all, on the question in issue. The inquiry then
becomes whether the federal judge may make an independent
decision on the basis of what he deems to be the right rule, or
whether he must examine other sources of state law in order to
ascertain what the law of the state would be if the issue were
before the state's highest court.2 9
26. Compare Friendly, supra note 21, at 76, with Vestal, supra
note 21, at 253.
27. The Supreme Court has recognized this fact in several deci-
sions. See, e.g., Bernhardt v. Polygraphic Co. of America, 350 U.S. 198, 205
(1956); King v. Order of United Commercial Travelers, 333 U.S. 153, 158
(1948).
28. Query how much of a restriction this places upon the federal
judge who wishes to make an independent decision and reads recent,
closely analogous cases narrowly in order to arrive at the conclusion
that the highest court has not spoken authoritatively on the question
presented.
29. In a discussion of the alternatives available to the federal
19691
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A. GUIDANCE FROM THE SuPRlzmE COURT
The Supreme Court has yet to express a definite opinion on
how the federal judge should ascertain state law when the high-
est state court has not spoken to the precise question in issue.
Nevertheless, a series of cases exist in which the ascertainment
question was either directly or collaterally raised and from
which it is possible to discern the development of a Court attitude
toward the proper role of the federal judge.
The development of this attitude began during the 1940 term
when the Court handed down four decisions80 indicating an ex-
tremely rigid position-or so they were taken by legal scholars of
the day 5 1 -toward the role of the federal judge with respect to
one source of state law-lower state court decisions. One opinion,
Fidelity Union Trust Company v. Field,3 2 from which the others
seem to follow a fortiori, held that a federal judge is bound by
the decision of a state trial court of state-wide jurisdiction, ab-
sent a ruling by the highest court of the state or other con-
vincing evidence of state law. The -principal argument in oppo-
sition to the decision was that litigants in federal court would
judge, a recent writer isolated three different attitudes among the
lower federal courts. (1) Some courts have exercised an entirely inde-
pendent judgment whenever feasible; (2) others have chosen to exer-
cise an independent judgment in light of intra-state evidence of the
law of the state (apparently this means that the federal court while
examining the same data that the state court employs assigns its own
values to it); (3) lately some federal ccurts have attempted to predict
how the state court would decide the case. INDiANA at 555. See also
Harnett & Thornton, supra, note 3, at 779-83.
30. Stoner v. New York Life Ins. Co., 311 U.S. 464 (1940); West
v. American Tel. & Tel. Co., 311 U.S. 223 (1940); Six Companies v.
Joint Highway Dist., 311 U.S. 180 (1940); Fidelity Union Trust Co. v.
Field, 311 U.S. 169 (1940).
31. See Clark at 292; Corbin at 766-70. The criticism by the
above authors of the Fidelity rule seems overly harsh in light of the
language of the cases. In the Fidelity case the rule was stated as
follows:
An intermediate state court in declaxing and applying the state
law is acting as an organ of the State and its determination, in
the absence of more convincing evidence of what the state law
is should be followed by a federal court in deciding a state
question.
Fidelity Union Trust Co. v. Field, 311 U.S. 169, 177-78 (1940) (emphasis
added). Certainly this statement of the judge's duty is sufficiently
broad to permit a more liberal interpretation of the 1940 cases than
either Clark or Corbin seem willing to admit. Of course, and perhaps
this is the point both authors were making, the Court made little attempt
to discuss any "other convincing evidence," and thus lower state court
decisions were given nearly conclusive effect.
32. 311 U.S. 169 (1940).
[Vol. 53:806
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receive a lower quality of justice than those in state court.33
This seemed to follow from the fact that other state courts were
not bound by decisions of such courts and as a result could dis-
pute the correctness of the lower state court's decision.3 4  In
1948, the Court apparently mellowed in its reverence for lower
state courts by finding that a federal court was not bound by a
decision of a South Carolina Common Pleas Court.3 5 In distin-
guishing Fidelity, the Supreme Court emphasized the peculiar
character of the Common Pleas Court, noting that it was not a
court of record, that its territorial jurisdiction included only a
small part of the state, and that its opinions were afforded little
weight by other South Carolina courts of coordinate jurisdiction.
The Court had another opportunity to speak to the ascer-
tainment question in 1956.36 In issue was the binding effect
under Vermont law of a clause purporting to make an arbitration
ruling final between the parties. In reversing the court of ap-
peals, the Supreme Court reaffirmed the Erie policy of diminish-
ing the effects of the accident of diversity. More important, the
Court indicated, in dicta, evidence which it considered relevant
to the question of state law when the most recent Vermont case
in point was nearly 50 years old. Suggested evidence included
confusion in recent Vermont decisions, developing lines of author-
ity which discredit established authority, dicta, doubts or am-
biguities in the opinions of Vermont judges on the question at
issue, and legislative development tending to undermine the ju-
dicial rule.T
On the basis of this series of cases it is possible to discern a
threefold attitude on the part of the Court. First, it is quite
clear that the federal judge must ascertain and apply state law
regardless of his personal belief as to its rightness.3 8 Second, the
Court recognizes that state law arises from many sources and
the federal judge must be cognizant of all such sources in making
his determination. 39 Finally, and to a very limited extent, the
Court has attempted to establish the relative weight to be given
each source. 40
33. Corbin at 775.
34. Id.
35. King v. Order of United Commercial Travelers, 333 U.S. 153
(1948).
36. Bernhardt v. Polygraphic Co. of America, 350 U.S. 198 (1956).
37. Id. at 205.
38. West v. American Tel. & Tel. Co., 311 U.S. 223, 236-37 (1940).
39. Bernhardt v. Polygraphic Co. of America, 350 U.S. 198 (1956);
see notes 36 & 37 supra, and accompanying text.
40. King v. Order of United Commercial Travelers, 333 U.S. 153(1948); Fidelity Union Trust Co. v. Field, 311 U.S. 169 (1940).
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B. DEVELOPENT WITHn THE Lowam FEDERAL COURTS
Within the general attitudes defined by the above cases, the
lower federal courts have worked out standards of decision-
making to be used in ascertaining state law.41 In recent years
the circuits have been tending toward a standard which requires
the federal judge, in ascertaining state law where no author-
itative decision by the state's highest court exists, to examine all
relevant data and decide the issue the same way as the state's
highest court would4 ---a method of judicial decision-making
which will be referred to as the prediction formula.43
A line of cases in the Eighth Circuit illustrates the develop-
ment of this standard. The major early case, Yoder v. Nu-
Enamel Corporation,44 in which the Eighth Circuit faced the as-
certainment problem seemed to adumbrate espousal of the pre-
diction formula. The court was faced with the substantive prob-
lem of applying the Nebraska "long-arm" statute to a foreign
corporation. In the course of its opinion it said that "[t]he
responsibility of the federal courts, in matters of local law, is
not to formulate the legal mind of the state, but merely to as-
certain and apply it.1 45 The court further suggested that it must
give regard to all available persuasive data including ". . . com-
pelling inferences or logical implications from other related adju-
dications . .. "46 As applied to the issues before it, the court
felt the above standard required application of the most recent
decision of the state's highest court in case of conflicting state
authority. Where no decision on the precise issue existed, the
court was not free to decide the case on the basis of logical
impulse or outside authority, but was compelled to look to prior
state decisions from which analogies and implications could be
drawn. The court thus examined an older decision to support
its conclusion that discontinuance of business within the state
terminated the agency in the state auditor for service of process.
Although language in the case suggests a new approach to the
ascertainment question that would pay meticulous heed to every
nuance of state law, substantial qualifications are apparent on
closer examination. The only data examined were some rather
equivocal statements in an old state decision. No reference was
41. See generally INDIANA at 555, 565.
42. See cases cited note 61 infra.
43. INDIANA at 550.
44. Yoder v. Nu-Enamel Corp., 117 F.2d 488 (8th Cir. 1941).
45. Id. at 489.
46. Id.
[Vol. 53:806
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made to legislative policy or to the attitude of the state court
toward the relevant statute. Furthermore, the court disclaimed
any obligation to make a "prediction" of how the Nebraska Su-
preme Court would presently decide the issue, arguing that such
activity was outside the proper sphere of judicial conduct.47 In
addition, the case was decided during the reign of the Fidelity
Union Trust Company v. Field rule,48 and in fact the court cited
one of the cases from the Fidelity series in its opinion.49 The
Yoder case, however, does recognize the multiplicity of data
which comprises the law of the state and, in characterizing the
state law as the "legal mind of the state,"50 seems to recognize
that philosophies of state courts as well as express holdings may
be relevant in ascertaining state law.
Subsequent cases in the Eighth Circuit 51 accepted the Fi-
delity rule then in vogue. Where a prior state court decision
existed, the federal court was bound to follow it, regardless of the
level of the state court and even if there were no convincing
evidence that the state's highest court would follow the decision.
As applied in Fidelity, the rule appeared to some scholars to strip
the federal judge of his judicial expertise and to prevent the
litigant in federal court from receiving the same quality of jus-
tice as that offered in state court.5 2 The Eighth Circuit, how-
ever, while accepting the Fidelity rule, seemed to apply it with a
different attitude. More emphasis was placed on the qualifi-
cation that the lower state court decision was binding only in
the absence of other "convincing evidence."53 Indeed, several of
these earlier cases made a genuine effort to examine other evi-
dence and balance its persuasive value against that of the lower
court decision.54
III. THE PREDICTION METHOD
Even in these early cases there were indications that the
Eighth Circuit was formulating a rule of ascertainment which
47. Id. at 490.
48. 311 U.S. 169 (1940).
49. The court cited West v. American Tel. & Tel. Co., 311 U.S. 223(1940); see 117 F.2d at 489.
50. 117 F.2d at 489.
51. E.g., Federal Deposit Ins. Corp. v. George-Howard, 153 F.2d
591 (8th Cir. 1946); Order of United Commercial Travelers v. Meinsen,
131 F.2d 176 (8th Cir. 1942).
52. Corbin at 775.
53. Fidelity Union Trust Co. v. Field, 311 U.S. 169, 178 (1940).
54. See, e.g., Order of United Commercial Travelers v. Meinsen,
131 F.2d 176 (8th Cir. 1943) (state statute declaring public policy was
considered convincing evidence).
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required the federal judge, in examining all relevant data avail-
able, to predict or forecast how the state's highest court would
decide the issue if the precise problem were before it. 5  More
recent cases have quite clearly stated that the duty of the fed-
eral judge, in the absence of explicit authority from the state's
highest court, is to predict.50 Illustrative of this principle is
the case of Brooten v. Cudahy Packing Company.57 In answer-
ing a question of first impression concerning application of the
Minnesota dramshop act the court said the problem was ". . . one
of endeavoring to determine what the Supreme Court of Minne-
sota would declare the Minnesota law to be were this case be-
fore it."r5 5  More recently a district court said it could not "...
choose the rule which it would adopt for itself, if free to do so,
but must choose the rule which it believes the state court, from
all that is known about its methods of reaching decisions, is likely
in the future to adopt."59
Such a standard squares with that advocated by legal
writers 0 and accepted by a majority of the other circuits.0 1 In
addition, this standard, while not expressly adopted by the Su-
preme Court, incorporates those policies which the Court has
stated to be fundamental to the Erie rule.(2 Although in-
adequate data may still cause erroneous predictions by federal
courts, the differences between the two jurisdictions will be less
55. See Order of United Commercial Travelers v. Meinsen, 131 F.2d
176, 181 (8th Cir. 1942); Yoder v. Nu-Enamel Corp., 117 F.2d 488 (8th
Cir. 1941).
56. E.g., Ross v. Philip Morris & Co., 328 F.2d 3 (8th Cir. 1964);
Weisser v. Otter Tail Power Co., 318 F.2d 375 (8th Cir. 1963); Southern
Farm Bureau Cas. Ins. Co. v. Mitchell, 312 F.2d 485 (8th Cir. 1963);
Phoenix Assurance Co. v. Buckner, 305 F.2d 54 (8th Cir.), cert.
denied, 371 U.S. 903 (1962); Brooten v. Cudahy Packing Co., 291 F.2d 284
(8th Cir. 1961); Laugness v. Fernstrom Storage & Van Co., 253 F. Supp.
810 (D.N.D. 1966).
57. 291 F.2d 284 (8th Cir. 1961).
58. Id. at 288.
59. Yarrow v. Sterling Drug, Inc., 263 F. Supp. 159, 161 (S.D.S.D.
1967).
60. Note, How a Federal Court Determines State Law, 59 HAv. L.
REv. 1299 (1946); Harnett & Thornton, Precedent in the Erie-Tompkins
Manner: A Decade in Retrospect, 24 N.Y.U.L.Q. 770 (1949); INDANA
passim.
61. Royal Indem. Co. v. Clingan, 364 F.2d 154 (6th Cir. 1966);
Union Bank & Trust Co. v. First Nat'l Bank & Trust Co., 362 F.2d
311 (5th Cir. 1966); Graves v. Associated Transport Inc., 344 F.2d 894
(4th Cir. 1965); Tavernier v. Weyerhaeuser Co., 309 F.2d 87 (9th Cir.
1962); Hartness v. Aldens, Inc., 301 F.2d 228 (7th Cir. 1962); Gerr v.
Emrick, 283 F.2d 293 (3d Cir. 1960), cert. denied, 365 U.S. 817 (1961);
Cooper v. American Airlines Inc., 149 F.2d 355 (2d Cir. 1945).
62. See notes 21 & 22 supra, and accompanying text.
[Vol. 53:806
FEDERAL INTERPRETATION
frequent than those that would occur if the federal judge, in
the absence of direct state authority, could make an independent
decision. As a result, equal intrastate application of the law re-
gardless of diversity of citizenship is promoted, and forum shop-
ping is correspondingly discouraged. Furthermore, the constitu-
tional underpinnings of Erie are satisfied by the prediction
formula. While federal judges are formulating a law to be ap-
plied within the boundaries of the states, they are doing so
only in the absence of state judicial action and in so doing are
recognizing and forwarding those unique policies, customs, and
philosophies of the state, the maintenance of which is protected
by the Constitution.6 3
The accuracy of prediction of state court decisions by the
federal judge depends on his ability to emulate the judicial de-
cision-making process of the state court. This, in turn, seems to
require an examination of all sources of state law and meth-
odologies of decision-making, in order to isolate those factors
peculiar to the particular state's judicial process which ma-
terially affect the outcome of litigation within the state. Anal-
ysis of diversity cases shows that the above process is presently
occurring to a considerable extent. It may, however, be legiti-
mately asked whether the present process implements the pre-
diction formula to the extent possible or desirable.
A. CURRENT APPLICATION OF THE PRDIcTioN FoamuiA
Obviously the first source a federal court must look to is
the decisional law of the state's highest court.64 As presently
stated the prediction formula is applied only in the absence of
state precedent. Consequently, if a holding of the state's highest
court is in point no prediction should be necessary. Two de-
cisions qualify this conclusion. The Supreme Court itself in Bern-
hardt v. Polygraphic Company of America 5 suggested in dicta
that in certain circumstances other indicia of state law may be
more persuasive than a 45 year old holding. The First Circuit
found such circumstances to exist in ascertaining the law of
63. Hart at 10.
64. West v. American Tel. & Tel. Co., 311 U.S. 223, 236 (1940):
the highest court of the state is the final arbiter of what is
state law. When it has spoken, its pronouncement is to be ac-
cepted by federal courts as defining state law unless it has
later given clear and persuasive indication that its pronounce-
ment will be modified, limited or restricted.
65. 350 U.S. 198 (1956). See also language cited supra note 64,
which implies that other data may override a prior high court decision.
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Mississippi with respect to negligence and privity of contract.66
A 1928 decision of the Mississippi Supreme Court was disre-
garded in light of its inconsistency with more recent decisions
in other jurisdictions with which the Mississippi Supreme Court
had expressed agreement. Since the purpose of the prediction
formula is to ascertain the law of the state as it would be ex-
pressed by the highest state court, these decisions which antici-
pate the overruling of older discredited state supreme court de-
cisions are clearly correct.
In the absence of a decision by the state's highest court,
other data must be examined in order to isolate those factors
which comprise the state rule of decision. The following exam-
ples from the Eighth Circuit serve to illustrate the use of col-
lateral data in predicting the law of a state. Considered dicta
by the state's highest court is often an accurate barometer of
trends in state law, and accordingly has been examined in numer-
ous cases by federal judges.6 7 While cases on all-fours from
the highest state court are quite obviously the most important
indicia of state law, tangentially analogous cases are also use-
ful. Such cases have been referred to in order to discern the
attitude of the state court toward a particular area of the law, to
find canons of construction to be applied to certain contracts or
statutes, or to glean what the state deems to be the important
policies to be promoted in particular areas of the law.68
Although not given the same significance as before 1948,60 de-
cisions of lower state courts as well as federal district courts
have been referred to by Eighth Circuit courts.70  Several fed-
eral judges have observed a state's reliance on a treatise,71 a Re-
statement,72 or a legal encyclopedia 73 to settle cases of first
66. Mason v. American Emery Wheel Works, 241 F.2d 906 (1st Cir.
1957).
67. Yoder v. Nu-Enamel Corp., 117 F.2d 488 (8th Cir. 1941).
68. Ross v. Philip Morris & Co., 328 F.2d 3 (8th Cir. 1964); Brooten
v. Cudahy Packing Co., 291 F.2d 284 (8th Cir. 1961); Reserve Mining Co.
v. Mesabi Iron Co., 172 F. Supp. 1 (D. Minn. 1959); Simmons v. Broom-
field, 163 F. Supp. 268 (W.D. Ark. 1958); Foxbilt, Inc. v. Citizens Ins.
Co., 128 F. Supp. 594 (S.D. Iowa 1955).
69. This follows from the change in attitude by the Supreme
Court as illustrated by King v. Order of United Commercial Trave-
lers, 333 U.S. 153 (1948).
70. Tuner v. Alton Banking & Trust Co., 181 F.2d 899 (8th Cir.
1950).
71. Ross v. Philip Morris & Co., 328 F.2d 3, 13 (8th Cir. 1964);
F. HARPER & F. JAmEs, THE LAw OF TORTS (1956).
72. Yarrow v. Sterling Drug, Inc., 263 F. Supp. 159, 161 (S.D.S.D.
1967) (RESTATEMENT OF TORTS).
73. Brown v. Chicago, R.I. & P. R.R., 212 F. Supp. 832, (D. Mo.),
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impression. Law review articles, particularly those of schools
within the state whose law is to be predicted, have also been
used.74 One of the sources of state law most frequently referred
to is decisions from other jurisdictions on which the state in
question tends to rely in resolving new issues.75
The above is not intended as an exhaustive list of data to
which federal judges have referred or should refer in predicting
state law. Other data peculiar to a particular state's jurispru-
dence can fit within the broad policy of duplicating the state's
mode of judicial decision-making. By experience with and
careful analysis of the state judicial process, judge and counsel
should be able to isolate and make use of other factors which
are material to the decision of cases in the state's highest court.76
B. CRMICISM Am POSSIBLE EXPANSION OF THE APPLICATION
OF THE PREDICTION FORMULA
While the Eighth Circuit has subscribed to the prediction
formula as the proper means of ascertaining state law and has
examined various characteristics 77 of the state judicial process
in implementing it, close analysis of several cases raises ques-
tions as to the accuracy of prediction on the basis of data pres-
ently used. Fundamental to an examination of collateral data
in the absence of an authoritative decision by the highest state
court is the requirement that the data be the same as that which
the state court itself would rely upon.
Numerous decisions are noteworthy for their assumption of
the obligation to predict state judicial behavior and their exam-
ination of collateral data, without offering evidence that the state
court would be persuaded by the same evidence.78 One exam-
aff'd., 323 F.2d 420 (8th Cir. 1963) (CoRpus Juius SECUNDUM referred to
as data of state law).
74. Southern Farm Bureau Cas. Ins. Co. v. Mitchell, 312 F.2d
485 (8th Cir. 1963); McIntyre v. Kansas City Coca-Cola Bottling Co.,
85 F. Supp. 708 (W.D. Mo. 1949).
75. St. Paul Fire & Marine Ins. Co. v. Northern Grain Co., 365
F.2d 361 (8th Cir. 1966); Weisser v. Otter Tail Power Co., 318 F.2d 375(8th Cir. 1963); Southern Farm Bureau Cas. Ins. Co. v. Mitchell, 312 F.2d
485 (8th Cir. 1963); Brooten v. Cudahy Packing Co., 291 F.2d 284 (8th
Cir. 1961); Peerless Ins. Co. v. Cerny & Assoc. Inc., 199 F. Supp. 951(D. Minn. 1961); Simmons v. Broomfield, 163 F. Supp. 268 (W.D. Ark.
1958); Beck v. F.W. Woolworth Co., 111 F. Supp. 824 (N.D. Iowa 1953).
76. See Harnett & Thornton, supra note 60; INDIANA at 554.
77. See cases cited notes 67-75 supra.
78. E.g., St. Paul Fire & Marine Ins. Co. v. Northern Grain Co.,
365 F.2d 361 (8th Cir. 1966); Schultz & Lindsay Const. Co. v. Erickson,
352 F.2d 425 (8th Cir. 1965); Weisser v. Otter Tail Power Co., 318 F.2d
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ple of this approach is Weisser v. Otter Tail Power Company,70
where the federal court was required to predict how North
Dakota would resolve the question of a utility company's duty to
maintain electrical lines. The court consulted several other juris-
dictions without inquiring whether North Dakota's highest court
was prone to follow any particular jurisdiction when faced with
similar questions of first impression. While an examination of
a particular state's proclivity toward relying on extra-juris-
dictional authority may not always be possible or fruitful, the
frequent reliance by federal courts on extra-jurisdictional
authority without evidence that the state would so rely raises
suspicions as to the accuracy of their predictions. In a more
recent decision,8 0 the circuit judge admitted making an inde-
pendent judgment on the question at issue but rationalized his
conduct by stating that the decision agreed with the district
court opinion which extensively examined the state law.
The method of decision-making described is strikingly sim-
ilar to the type of independent judgment which the prediction
formula repudiated. This is not to suggest that it is easy to
determine the extent to which a gi.ven state relies on certain
data, or that preferences for a particular extraterritorial law
always exist. The prediction formula is perhaps more difficult
to administer than the independent judicial process.8 ' It can,
however, be applied in a careful and well reasoned opinion.82
A failure to analyze the particular state's attitude toward the
data relied upon suggests that the federal judge is making the
decision according to what he, rather than the state court, deems
to be correct.
The very statement that federal trial courts, in the absence
of an authoritative decision by the state's highest court, must
predict how that court would decide the issue at bar suggests
that many factors not previously discussed may be relevant.8 3
375 (8th Cir. 1963); Peerless Ins. Co. v. Cerny & Assoc. Inc., 199 F. Supp.
951 (D.C. Minn. 1961).
79. 318 F.2d 375 (8th Cir. 1963).
80. St. Paul Fire & Marine Ins. Co. v. Northern Grain Co., 365
F.2d 361 (8th Cir. 1966).
81. ". . . [I]t is easier to make good law than successfully to predict
how it will be made." Wright, Federal Courts and the Nature and Qual-
ity of the State Law, 13 WAYNE L. REV. 317, 322 (1967).
82. Compare the close examination of state law and policy in
Judge Blackmun's opinion in Brooten v. Cudahy Packing Co., 291 F.2d
284 (8th Cir. 1961), with what appears to be an independent analysis of
the law by Judge Matthes in St. Paul Fire & Marine Ins. Co. v.
Northern Grain Co., 365 F.2d 361 (8th Cir. 1966).
83. For example, many state Supreme Courts discourage dissenting
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Courts are composed of men whose personalities, backgrounds,
and philosophies cannot be entirely divorced from their work.
Additionally, the high courts of states are institutions which have
their own peculiar idiosyncrasies and customs. Recent writers
have recognized that such factors are necessarily reflected in
judicial decisions.84 Perhaps of more consequence, lawyers who
work with these men and institutions have learned to "study"
the past behavior of judges and courts in order to counsel clients
better. Professor Llewellyn, among others, has suggested that a
proper understanding of stare decisis requires an appreciation
for and knowledge of judicial and court personalities8 5 The
question therefore arises whether and to what extent these and
similar factors should be employed by federal judges in pre-
dicting state law. Two considerations are apparent at the out-
set. First, if the Constitution, as interpreted in Erie, requires
the same outcome in federal as in state court regardless of the
accident of diversity, it would seem that every possible element
should be examined in order to achieve an accurate prediction
of state law.86 Second, if state appellate lawyers successfully
employ such factors to predict the decisions of state courts, and
federal judges do not, there is an opportunity for forum shopping
on the part of the resourceful counsel. Previous discussions of
the role of the federal judge in ascertaining state law have
either ignored the personalities of state judges and courts8 7 or
have dismissed them as inappropriate considerations.8 8
Several examples of data not previously examined by fed-
eral courts will serve to illustrate the potential expansion of the
role of the federal judge in predicting state law. Dicta in state
opinions for the sake of harmony and public appearance. Such a policy
certainly has an effect on the authority of opinions in which several
members of the court privately disagreed, but felt unable openly to
register the extent of or reason for their dissatisfaction. Such an opin-
ion, while apparently expressing a broad rule of law, may represent the
thinking of a bare majority of the court. In states where this occurs
the opinions of the court should be handled with caution. See Pomer-
antz v. Clark, 101 F. Supp. 341 (D. Mass. 1951) (Wyzanski, J.).
84. E.g., J. FRANK, LAW AND THE MODERN MIN (1930); JUDIcIAL
DEcISION-MAKIG (G. Schubert ed., 1963); K. LLEWELLYN, THE COM-
mON LAW TRADITION: DECIDING APPEALS (1960).
85. LLEwELLYN, supra note 84.
86. One alternative to the federal court searching for state law
under these circumstances is to seek the state court's advice. The
Florida Supreme Court has provided for such a procedure by per-
mitting the federal court to certify questions of state law to it. FLA.
STAT. ANN. Rule 4.61 (1967).
87. See Harnett & Thornton, supra note 60; Note, supra note 60.
88. INDIaNA at 554.
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court opinions is frequently employed by federal courts in as-
certaining state law.8 9 Ordinarily its use is valid. But consider
a state supreme court which discourages dissents and whose
opinions therefore contain considerable dicta which normally
would be expressed in, or qualified by, dissent. Certainly such
a practice will affect the validity of dicta in that particular state
as a barometer of the judicial climate. No case has been found,
however, which discussed the existence of this practice and its
relationship to the validity of dicta as a source of state law. On
the other hand, state trial lawyers are undoubtedly aware of
such a characteristic and modify their own predictions of state
law accordingly.
A further example of datum rarely employed by federal
courts is the philosophy of the court as a whole. Judge Wyzanski
of the federal district court in Massachusetts, in determining
whether under certain circumstances a derivative suit could be
maintained by a stockholder, examined the philosophy of the
Massachusetts Supreme Judicial Court as an institution.00 He
discovered from this examination a conservative attitude toward
the creation of new causes of action and a skepticism toward
the effectiveness of suits by minority stockholders. He there-
fore concluded that the Massachusetts court would not find a
cause of action in favor of the minority stockholder in the form
of a derivative suit. Care should be exercised in personifying an
institution such as a court, whose membership and attitudes
change. However, where an attitude toward a particular area
of the law has developed within a given court, its relevance to
the prediction of state law may be considerable. This seems
especially true in cases where other indicia of state law are in-
conclusive as to the way the issue would be decided by the
state's highest court.91
89. See note 67 supra, and accompanying text.
90. Pomerantz v. Clark, 101 F. Supp. 341 (D. Mass. 1951). In
examining this philosophy, Wyzanski said:
The emphasis is on precedent and adherence to the older
ways, not on creating new causes of action or encouraging the
use of novel judicial remedies that have sprung up in less con-
servative communities.
In the state court there is also an evident if not declared
skepticism about the effectiveness of minority stockholders'
suits. ...
Id. at 346.
91. The Eighth Circuit seems to have looked to judicial attitude in
Ross v. Philip Morris & Co., 328 F.2d 3 (Sth Cir. 1964), a case where all
other data was equivocal. The court found that the Missouri Supreme
Court applied strict liability only when "social justice" so required.
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Closely associated with the indicia discussed above are the po-
litical, religious, moral, and social attitudes of individual judges
of state courts. Lawyers, in weighing the wisdom of taking an
appeal and the utility of various types of arguments, are con-
scious of such factors. Furthermore, studies show that these
attitudes often reveal how a judge will decide a particular ques-
tion of law.9 2 Once again, however, there is no mention, either
in opinions or legal writings, of the use and relevance of this
data in the prediction of state law.
The above discussion is only a partial enumeration of addi-
tional data presently overtly ignored by federal courts in pre-
dicting state law. Experienced appellate lawyers, legal scholars,
and behavioral scientists93 are capable of listing other indicia
which they consider relevant to the process of decision-making
in state courts.
Three further questions must be answered in evaluating the
role such additional data should play in the prediction of state
law: (1) Can such data be effectively employed by federal
judges? (2) Is it presently being covertly or unconsciously re-
lied upon by federal judges? (3) To what extent should it be
employed in judicial decision-making by federal judges in diver-
sity of citizenship cases?
In answering the first question, it must be conceded that the
reliability of many of these factors is subject to doubt, particu-
larly those which explain judicial conduct on the basis of the
judge's background and personality. Only recently have studies
been conducted to try to determine their relevance to judicial
decision-making. 94 Certainly the federal judge cannot be ex-
pected to employ data the validity of which is suspect according
to present legal or scientific experience. Additionally, the use
of such data is hindered by the difficulty of presenting it to the
court. Much of this difficulty may be due to lawyers' reluctance
to stray from accepted notions of "proper" judicial conduct,
and the occasionally personal nature of the data. The avail-
ability and use of scientific studies which verify the relevance
of such data to the judicial process may partially remedy this
problem. Difficulty of proof may also discourage the use of such
data, perhaps justifiably so. However, even this problem may
92. See generally JumrcIAL DECiSION-MAKInG (G. Schubert ed.,
1963); A Symposium: Social Science Approach to the Judicial Process,
79 HARv. L. REv. 1551 (1966).
93. See note 92 supra.
94. Id.
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be overcome. Where the validity of particular information is
reinforced by the experience of the legal community, the fed-
eral judge-frequently a former state lawyer-will probably be
aware of it. The present policy in the courts of appeals is to
defer to the federal district court judges' determinations of state
law precisely because of their close connection to state legal
systems.9 5 Continuance and expansion of this policy of deference
might well increase the reliance of upper federal courts on
much of the collateral data previously mentioned, since the re-
sponsibility for decision would be in the hands of those who
are closest to such data.
The second question-whether such data is presently being
covertly employed-is, of course, difficult to answer. The fre-
quently close relationship between the federal district judge and
the state's highest court, discussed above, leads one to suspect
that at least some of the data employed by lawyers of the state
in their predictions is available to federal judges. The extent of
its impact is another question. By failing to discuss such evi-
dence in their opinions, federal judges are able more easily to
ignore it and base their decisions on what they feel to be the
correct rule of law.
Lastly, to what extent, if at all, should the federal courts
employ such data? As was noted earlier, the two grounds enun-
ciated by the Erie opinion,96 and developed and reaffirmed by
subsequent cases, 97 seem to require the federal judge to predict
state law as accurately as possible and avoid unnecessary inde-
pendent decisions. However, countervailing considerations may
place limitations on the extent to which such policies need be
effectuated by the federal judge. The question whether such
data could be used accurately has already been discussed. But
certainly the problem of accuracy raises not only a "could"
question but also a "should" question. The use of data, whose
relevance to the state decision-making process has not been
proved by either scientific or judicial experience, seems incon-
sistent with our legal system's belief that decisions should be
based on carefully tested fact rather than conjecture. Moreover,
the use of such data will quite probably place additional de-
95. But see Note, Unclear State Law in the Federal Courts: Ap-
pellate Deference on Review, 48 MIN. L. REv. 747 (1964). The author
suggests that the policy of deference by federal appellate judges to dis-
trict court judges on questions of state law denies the diversity litigant
the same opportunity he would have in a state appellate court.
96. See text accompanying notes 21 &z 22 supra.
97. See cases cited note 24 supra.
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mands on the time and energy of the federal judge" and may
give undue advantage to the litigant who can afford exhaustive
studies of the state decision-making process 9 Finally, there is
the consideration raised many times before, that the judge will
be stripped of his right and obligation to exercise his own fac-
ulties in deciding a case. 00 In the past, this argument was
answered by reference to the overriding need for intra-state
uniformity.1° 1 However, recent cases in which the Supreme
Court has been required to determine whether a state rule of
law was substantive or procedural have recognized that because
of the very nature of federalism, federal as well as state interests
must be afforded due regard.10 2 While the question of ascertain-
ment presumes that state rather than federal law is to be applied,
legitimate federal interests such as administrative efficiency,
may be relevant in deciding the extent to which the state ju-
dicial process must be examined by the federal judge.
IV. CONCLUSION
While legitimate doubts exist as to the necessity of diversity
of citizenship jurisdiction and the wisdom of the Erie rule, both
remain entrenched in our law.103 This being so, the federal
judge faces the problem of ascertaining and applying state law,
a problem which becomes particularly difficult when there is no
recent authoritative declaration from the state's highest court on
the legal point in issue.
The prediction formula for guiding the federal judge seems
to forward those policies best which underlie the rule enunciated
in Erie. In applying the prediction formula the question is raised
as to the extent to which the state judicial process must be scru-
tinized in order to predict state law. While identity of result be-
tween state and federal litigation is to be strived for, the neces-
98. This argument was made by Wright, supra note 81, with
respect to the prediction formula in general.
99. A similar argument with respect to lower state court decisions
is suggested in King v. Order of United Commercial Travelers, 333
U.S. 153, 162 (1948).
100. Clark at 290-91. An early articulation of the idea that the fed-
eral court has an obligation to employ its judicial expertise was made by
Justice Bradley in Burgess v. Seligman, 107 U.S. 34 (1883), apparently in
response to an argument in favor of an Erie rule. After Erie, Clark,
supra, used the same theory in criticizing what he thought to be a
mechanical application of the Erie rule in ascertaining state law.
101. E.g., West v. American Tel. & Tel. Co., 311 U.S. 223, 236 (1940).
102. Hanna v. Plummer, 380 U.S. 460 (1965); Byrd v. Blue Ridge
Elec. Co-op., 356 U.S. 525 (1958).
103. See generally C. WRiGHT, FEDERAL CouRTs § 23 (1963).
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sary degree of scrutiny of the state legal process, in order to
achieve near-absolute identity, may be neither possible nor de-
sirable. Nonetheless, improvements can be made in applying
the formula which will ensure a more accurate prediction. First,
in examining collateral sources of state law, more care should be
taken to recognize subtleties of the state judicial process which
affect the outcome of litigation before the state's highest court.
Second, the federal judge should remember that the weight to
be afforded such collateral data is to be measured by the state
standard, not the federal standard. Third, in those areas of the
law where both intraterritorial and extraterritorial authority is
conflicting or equivocal, the philosophy of the state court and
the judges who compose it should be recognized as legitimate
data to be employed in predicting how that court would de-
cide the issue. Such an attitudinal or philosophical examination
need not, and probably cannot, assume the proportions of a
psychological analysis. But those characteristics of the state ju-
dicial process recognized and employed by state appellate law-
yers in deciding the wisdom of appeal should not be overlooked
by federal judges. Furthermore, regardless of the actual use of
such additional data, recognition by federal judges of their exist-
ence and relevance should result in an approach to the problem
of ascertaining state law which conforms more closely to the
dictates of Erie.
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